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ABSTRACT 
I extend Butler and Cornaggia (2011) to examine the impact on agricultural productivity of 
shocks in access to capital and the impact of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 
moderating these shocks.  Adapting their empirical methodology in Butler and Cornaggia (2011), 
I find that the financial crisis of 2008 exacerbates the negative relation between counties with 
low access to capital and productivity.  Further, I find that this negative relation is reduced in 
counties where more banks took advantage of TARP financing.  My results underscore the 
impact of access to capital on productivity and also suggest that the TARP has beneficial effects 
in the agricultural sector.  
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Introduction 
 I extend the study of Butler and Cornaggia (2011) that looked at the relationship of 
access to finance and how it impacted crop productivity of soybeans and corn.  The authors 
examine this relationship during the ethanol boom when there was an increase in the demand of 
corn.  I use their empirical model and adjust my sample period in order to look at the impacts of 
the 2008 financial crisis. I then pull into account a measure that captures the influence the TARP 
has in moderating the effects of the financial crisis. The TARP was enacted by the government in 
late 2008 in order to stabilize our economy and increase liquidity in our financial sector.  The 
underlying purpose of the government’s action was to create opportunity for lending to occur so 
the markets would not freeze and further worsen the U.S. economy. 
 There have been many studies to measure the impacts of the TARP.  However, little 
research has been done to see how the TARP affected the agricultural sector.  It is important to 
take into consideration the effects of such governmental actions in all industries. Looking at 
impacts as seen in the agricultural sector is very different to most similar studies that have 
focused on more industrial settings and productivity at the firm level.   
 However, if a similar crisis occurred again agriculture is one of two industries the 
government might consider infusing more capital into. The agricultural sector is an industry that 
is much more efficient at generating input (capital infusions) to economic output. Therefore, if 
the government finds themselves in a similar situation to 2008, it would be beneficial to 
understand how the TARP affected and impacted the agricultural sector in particular because it 
was one of the few industries that show a high economic return from capital infusions (Aardt and 
Naidoo 2010).    
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 Based on my results, I find that the financial crisis did have a negative impact on 
productivity for the set of counties most likely to be impacted by the financial crisis.  I 
specifically examine productivity impacts of the financial crisis for counties with poor access to 
finance relative to counties with better access to finance. Among others things, TARP was 
supposed to provide capital injections to banks to help with lending. Therefore, when there are 
more TARP banks in a county, then the productivity hampering effects of having low deposits 
(i.e. the poor access to finance measure) are offset by the lending incentive effects of TARP. In 
my research I found this to be true; this brings us to the conclusion that TARP did bring positive 
light to the dark days of the 2008 financial crisis.   
 Section two details my literature review and hypothesis development.  Section three 
presents the research design and data.  Section four discusses the results. Section five discusses 
supplemental testing, and I conclude with section six. 
 
Literature Review & Hypothesis  
During the early and mid-2000s, the United States’ economy was hit with several crises.  
The technology bubble burst mid-way through the year 2000.  The terrorist attacks of 2001 
brought the country to its knees.  Unemployment and entrepreneurial failures were on the rise, 
and there was an increase in corporate scandals during these years. The combination of all of 
these events created a situation of economic uncertainty amongst the United States people.  As 
the decade was coming to a close, the ever famous 2008 Financial Crisis hit the country and 
impacted the lives of millions.  The housing bubble burst, people lost their jobs on a grand scale, 
and banks were filing for bankruptcy.  In the midst of all these different crises, each having their 
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own impact on the people and industry, the government decided to announce a new program in 
an effort to help get the country back on its feet.        
In late September 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported that the financial crisis had 
continued to march downward.  Banks essentially stopped lending to each other, both directly 
and indirectly, by charging exceedingly higher rates. These actions put further strain on the U.S. 
and European economies and brought their lending capacities to a standstill (Mollenkamp 2008). 
Following this announcement the Wall Street Journal put out an article discussing how the 
United States’ financial system resembled a patient in intensive care. At that point the economy 
could not “fix” itself and was seemingly at the point of no return. “The illness seems to be 
overwhelming the self-healing tendencies of markets” (Hilsenrath 2008). 
 In effect, during the 2000s, both individuals and banks had taken on way too much debt. 
Due to these actions, the banks found themselves in a situation where they could not pay back 
their creditors.  In order to stop the worsening dilemma, banks needed to do three things; mark 
down the value of distressed assets, pay off debt, and rebuild their capital cushion (Hilsenrath 
2008).  These items needed to occur quickly and efficiently; however, they all negatively 
impacted their ability to boost the economy causing further constraint on bank lending.  
The United States’ government soon answered these concerns with The Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), specifically the Capital Purchase Program (CPP).  This program was 
launched by the U.S. Department of Treasury to stabilize the financial system in this time of 
economic uncertainty in our country.  The Troubled Asset Relief fund was created on October 3, 
2008, following the passing of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.  It gave the U.S. 
Treasury $700 billion dollars to issue in order to provide capital in aiding financial institutions.  
The Dodd-Frank Act later reduced the $700 billion authorized to $475 billion (United States 
4 
 
Treasury). The program focused on providing capital to financial institutions that met the 
necessary requirements. The main driver behind this program was the fear of all lending coming 
to a standstill causing a continued downward spiral for our nation’s economy if the government 
did not intervene. 
Although the government stood firmly behind its program and the positive effects it 
would have, specifically in the increase of liquidity in financial institutions, many did not believe 
that the program would work.  It was broadly viewed as a simple bailout to banks that needed the 
money to solve their problems.  Many believed that the financial institutions would hold on to 
the capital instead of spurring economic growth through lending (Appelbaum 2009). This idea 
was well publicized across the nation in the various periodicals and journals. While a lot of the 
comments were directed towards the larger banks that were bailed out (i.e. Citibank, J.P. Morgan 
Chase, Eaglebank), many still viewed the overall program to be an unwise use of taxpayer 
dollars. These negative opinions are where my overlying research questions derive from.  
Did the Financial Crisis impact the relative productivity of corn and soybeans 
consistent with increased constraints in access to finance?  
 
Did the TARP moderate the effects of the financial crisis on productivity 
consistent with an easing of access to finance constraints?  
 
Many papers begin their discussion of the effects on the TARP by referencing the 
research of Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) and their study of the “bailout” of the Japanese financial 
institutions.  This study, along with general public consensus, questioned if capital infusions 
were the best action for our government to take during the U.S. 2008 financial crisis. More 
specifically, they questioned if other alternatives would have generated more positive economic 
results.  The ability for these capital infusions to perform well relied heavily on weak banks 
participating in the government program (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).  Other factors might have 
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limited such banks from participating due to fear of the negative impacts accepting government 
aid could have on their stock yields and their performance in the future (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2010).  If these concerns of the banks were viable, one might say that those who accepted the 
capital infusions were in enough trouble that they did not have much of a choice.  Therefore, 
some inferred that the capital infusions were holding up already weak illiquid institutions which 
could lead to asset fire sales further causing liquidity to dry up in the financial system (Diamond 
2009).  
The ideas discussed by Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) counteract other research that found 
that banks who opted out of the TARP program did not promptly disclose.  This counteracts the 
logical thought that if banks were worried about their stock yields in regard to accepting TARP 
they would quickly disclose the opt-out. Bens, Chyz, and Neamtiu (2014) found that 55% of 
banks did not disclose their opt-out of TARP. Further research found that on average those who 
did not disclose were poorer performing financial institutions. One could infer that they might 
have performed better if they had accepted the TARP funding.  Overall, most discussions saw 
the many different result possibilities of the program being counteractive to one another.           
 The negative publicity of TARP and growing concern of the financial situation of our 
banks and overall economy put a lot of pressure on the banks to perform well.  Thus, not only 
did they have to overcome the financial aspect of the crisis but the push from their stockholders 
to adjust and have good projections for the future.  Despite these pressures and negative 
publicity, on average banks participating in the TARP had more positive financial performance 
before and after the program initiation (Ng 2011). Therefore, contrary to the negative sentiment, 
the TARP was aiding the banks in their endeavors. Market valuations diverged from their 
fundamentals due to investor sentiment and not lack of performance which proved to be evidence 
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of the negativity connation owners put with their companies being “bailed out” (Hoshi and 
Kashyap 2010).  
 The important notion to take into consideration is that many of these papers showed the 
TARP to have a positive impact on bank performance and overall lending.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that TARP did moderate the effects of the financial crisis and was a 
responsible action from a U.S. government policy standpoint.   
 TARP investments increased the loan supply by an annual rate of 6.43% for banks 
categorized as having below Tier 1 ratios, defined as Tier 1 (core) capital divided by risk-
weighted total assets (Li 2013). This increase in loan supply further suggests that banks that 
accepted governmental aid via TARP used roughly one third of the capital infusions to support 
loans lended out to consumers (Li 2013). The study done by Li is not similar to mine in terms of 
showing concrete economic impact, but it does suggest that the TARP created opportunity for 
positive, impactful economic opportunity. 
 
Hypothesis: 
My analysis observes the relationship of the financial crisis and Troubled Asset Relief 
Program and each of their impacts on the agricultural sector by looking at crop yields, essentially 
measuring how productive farmers were in periods before the financial crisis (when capital was 
less difficult to obtain) relative to periods after the financial crisis (when capital access is 
constrained).  Butler and Cornaggia (2011) discussed how a farmer’s budget is heavily reliant on 
how much capital they can receive. Capital shows to be very impactful on how productive the 
farmers can be; this is due to farmer’s having to pay for a majority of their costs up front and not 
receiving any revenues until the end of the harvesting season.  The more money they have access 
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to for seed, fertilizer, and many other inputs can have huge consequences on how well their crop 
performs.  Based on these facts and those proved by Butler and Cornaggia (2011) my first 
hypothesis looks at the impact that strictly the financial crisis has on crop productivity.  Due to 
the financial crisis causing banks to be willing to loan out less of their money, my first 
hypothesis assumes gaining access to capital was much harder for farmers post financial crisis in 
the years of 2009, 2010, and 2011. 
 
H1:  There is a more negative association between productivity and access to finance in 
the post financial crisis period.  
 
The second main focus in my study is the interaction of the counties with low access to 
capital and the TARP.  For my second hypothesis I examine the effect that I propose in 
hypothesis 1 to see if it is moderated when low access to capital counties have more TARP 
backed deposits (i.e. more banks participating in the TARP program). I focus on if counties with 
more banks that received TARP funding showed greater productivity. Thus, I make the 
assumption that low access to capital counties that have more banks participating in the TARP 
program would have higher crop productivity than banks in a similar financial situation (low 
access to capital) with a lower ratio of bank deposits backed by the TARP.  My assumption is 
based on that the TARP increases the amount of loans lent out, further proving the results of 
Butler and Cornaggia (2011) that the amount of capital available has a large impact on the 
success of productivity.  
H2:  The more negative association between productivity and access to finance in the 
post financial crisis period is moderated by the TARP bank presence. 
  
Research Design & Data: 
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The data I used to generate my tests is captured annually at a county level across twelve 
Midwestern, high crop yielding states. The states in my study are as follows:  Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, 
and Wisconsin. I gathered data from the same twelve states as Butler and Cornaggia (2011) for 
the years 2005 through 2011, excluding 2008. My sample period includes the ethanol boom, 
financial crisis, and issuance of the TARP. Butler and Cornaggia (2011) looked at periods before 
and after the ethanol boom to test their theory.  I focus on periods after the ethanol boom so that 
the effect of the ethanol boom does not confound the effects I document in my study. The 
beginning of the ethanol boom was in the year 2005. I use the years 2005-2007 as my 
comparative sample prior to the 2008 financial crisis and the years of 2009 through 2011 to 
measure the economic impacts exposed by the financial crisis. For my research method, I used 
the same empirical model that was used in Butler and Cornaggia (2011) (see below). Subscripts 
I, t, and k denote county, year, and crop respectively. I perform a multivariate ordinary least 
squares regression, using the same model for both corn and soybean yields.  
 Yield_Cornit   = α0 + β1Financeit + β2Crisis_Periodt + β3Finance*Crisis_Periodit  
 + β4TARPit + β5Finance*TARPit + βnXit + βkS  + ei   
 
Based on my model and research design, I should be able to see support of Hypothesis 1 
in the interaction of the Finance and Crisis_Period variables. I expect to find a negative 
coefficient in this interaction as it captures the difference in output in the financial crisis period 
when finance is poor (Finance =0) and the TARP ratio is zero compared to when finance is 
higher (Finance = 1). Support for Hypothesis 2 will be found in the interaction of the Finance, 
Crisis_Period, and TARP variables. It explains the change documented in Finance_Crisis_Period 
in the relation to the change of TARP funding. Specifically, the increasing TARP counteracts the 
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negative impact on productivity brought about by low access to capital in the post financial crisis 
period. I expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive. 
Independent Variables:  
The first independent variable of interest is access to finance. I sum all of the bank 
deposits held in banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) in any given 
county; this data can be found on their website. Butler and Cornaggia (2011) found that banks 
with more deposits make more agricultural loans; this was one of their key insights for 
understanding the impact of access to finance on crop productivity.  My main measure of access 
to finance is of the counties that are in the lowest quintile of bank deposits.  My results suggest 
that for counties in the lowest quintile, productivity is relatively lower during the financial crisis. 
This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that banks were, on average, less willing 
to loan money following the financial crisis 
Another independent variable and the one unique to my study is one that represents the 
impact of the Troubled Asset Relief Program.  This variable is the ratio of the sum of all banks 
deposits held within banks that received the TARP funding to the sum of all bank deposits held 
within the same given county.  I gathered this data from the U.S. Treasury Department by 
looking at the Transaction Report data from October 1
st
 2010.  I chose to use this data because it 
showed the best representation of the TARP because by this point all firms have been selected 
for the program and have received funding. 
The other variable unique to my study is the crisis period. This is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for years after crisis period (2009-2011) and 0 for years prior to the financial crisis 
(2005-2007). In my study, data from the years of 2009, 2010, and 2011 are defined as the post 
crisis period because they occurred after the initial financial crisis of 2008. It was during these 
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years that the economy was distressed and many changes in the financial sector were occurring.  
The years of 2005, 2006, and 2007 are before the financial crisis hit and are used as a baseline to 
look at the impacts that the financial crisis has on productivity. 
Dependent Variables:  
The dependent variables used in this study are the corn and soybean yields for the given 
years. I gathered the data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) website. I 
took the county level of bushels harvested per acre for each crop to measure the output. 
Control Variables:   
In my study I used the same control variables found in that of Butler and Cornaggia 
(2011).  As expected the weather has a huge impact on the success of a harvested crop.  I 
controlled for this by gathering observations of precipitation and growing degree days from 
Weather Underground. Growing degree days is a typical, relevant measure used in the 
agricultural industry. There is one slight variation in our studies; Butler and Cornaggia (2011) 
took four weather stations from each state and assigned all counties within the state to one of the 
four chosen weather stations. I chose the most centrally located weather station in each state and 
assigned its results to all the counties in that state. This is due to my inability to replicate the 
assumptions of Butler and Cornaggia (2011) for county weather station assignment. This is under 
the assumption that weather will not have a significant differentiation across a given state.   
 I also controlled for population density, as this can be directly tied to both crop yields and 
county level bank deposits.  I calculated population density by using the estimates of county 
population from 2005 to 2011 found on the US Census Bureau website, and then divided the 
estimate of a county’s population by the county’s square mileage. I control for economic 
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conditions with county level unemployment rates and per capita income. These data sets were 
also available on the US Census Bureau website. 
 Per capita income from 2009 through 2011 could be found on the US Census Bureau 
website for the entirety of my sample period. However, for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 only 
partial data sets were available.  Due to this I estimate some of the per capita data.  I did this by 
running a model for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011 of per capita income, unemployment, and 
population density.  I then analyzed my model and calculated a beta from the years that I have 
full data sets. I used this beta to estimate the per capita income for the years 2005, 2006, and 
2007.  Therefore, for 2005-2007 per capita income is an estimate based off of a function of my 
beta, unemployment rate, and population density.  I checked the robustness of this estimate 
against my partial data sets gathered for 2005-2007 and found it to be accurate.   
 
Results  
I pooled all of the data together for all years included in my sample period.  I then 
performed univariate t-tests on the average difference in means. I partitioned the data set on 
Crisis_Period which determined two groups:  prior to the financial crisis and post financial crisis. 
After parting out the data I calculated the averages of the yields for the two subsets and 
performed a t-test on average differences in means.  
I then further partitioned the data based on my finance variable. I partitioned the data by 
counties in the lowest quintile of my study with poorest access to capital and the remaining 
counties who were not under such strenuous capital restraints.   From this partition you see that 
counties with greater access to capital have a higher increase in productivity seen in both corn 
and soybean yields after the financial crisis. Visuals of these changes can be seen in Figures 
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1&2. Figure 3 shows the results of my univariate t-tests on average difference in means. The 
increase of productivity seen in the high access to capital counties show statistical significance 
for both crops. However, for counties with low access to capital the increase in soybeans was not 
statistically significant and for corn, while statistically significant, is not as large as it is in the 
counties with more access to capital.     
 Therefore, the baseline trend shows to be an increase in output over time, and this 
increase was not greatly impacted by the 2008 financial crisis except for counties with low 
access to capital.  If that was the case, the baseline trend was halted with respect to soy and to 
some extent corn.  This would be the case if the demand for soy was increasing over time, even 
in the financial crisis, but farmers in areas with low access to capital could not meet these 
demands because they did not have the resources to produce due to the banks not lending as 
much money after the crisis period.  This reduced lending can also explain why counties with 
lower access to capital have lower corn yields when compared to those counties with more 
access to capital. 
 For my preliminary support for H2, I have Figures 3 & 4. For these results I partitioned 
my data set based on their access to finance and then further divided the data based on their 
TARP ratios. Based on the division of the data set one should be able to recognize the impact 
that the TARP has on the productivity based on the average bushels per acre that is recorded for 
each group. The results show that counties with low access to capital and high TARP ratios 
harvested roughly four bushels more per acre of soybeans than counties with low access to 
capital and low TARP ratios.  The increase of productivity due to TARP can also be seen in the 
counties with higher access to capital, but the results are not as significant.        
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The results of my multivariate tests are compiled in Table 5. I accounted for state fixed 
effects for soy and corn yields in columns 2 and 4 respectively.  For H1 this made my results 
more statistically significant.  I see strong support for H1 which stated that there is a more 
negative association between productivity and access to finance in the post financial crisis 
period.  In terms of crop productivity one can assume, based off of these results, (taking into 
account state fixed affects) that farmers in counties with low access to finance harvested -3.6 
bushels of soybeans per acre compared to farmers in counties with higher access to finance.  
My results do not support H2 as strongly, specifically my results from the corn yields. I 
find that the results from corn yields do not show to be statistically significant.  However, the 
results do prove to be significant when looking at my results for soybeans.  Note that this is a 
positive relationship due my Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP variable showing the TARP 
mitigating the effects of the Finance_Crisis_Period interaction.   
We can question why corn does not show significant results in this test. One reason for 
this is that corn and soybeans are very different crops and are significantly different markets.  I 
discussed that the time period of my study is after the ethanol boom.  This could cause the TARP 
to have less of an impact because the demand for the crop is still significantly rising.       
 
Supplemental Testing 
An additional regression that I ran was based on lending based on the “type” of bank in 
the selected counties.  The call reports that were used to gather deposit data for my finance 
variable banks can be categorized as being agricultural banks.  Due to my study showing how the 
TARP impacted the agricultural sector, I chose to see if banks being categorized as such would 
show different results. I introduced this additional test separately to consider heavy agricultural 
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lending presence to see if the effects that I proved might be stronger. I partition the regression by 
dividing the counties at the annual median based on a ratio defined by the amount of deposits 
from agricultural banks divided by the total amount of deposits in the county. This gave me two 
different groups to run through the regression (Agro 0 and Agro 1). 
I define Agro 0 as the group of counties with a lower agricultural banking ratio.  I find 
that for both groups my hypothesis holds true with counties who have lower access to capital 
having a more negative impact on their crop production during the crisis period.  However, when 
I look at the results based on my three way interaction term and see that the TARP has a much 
larger impact in the counties that have a higher ratio of agricultural banks. This can especially be 
seen in Table 6 with the t-statistic tripling for the Agro 1 counties when looking at soy yield.  
Furthermore, when you look at the corn yields, the impact of the TARP is insignificant for the 
Agro = 0 group, but the TARP showed to have a significant impact on the counties with more.  
These results would be expected if farmers are more likely to do business with the banks 
that are categorized as agricultural financial institutions.  These banks may be smaller and closer 
to where the farmers are.  Since the TARP provided a lot more capital to the banks, and farm 
loans tend to be viewed as low risk loan, the TARP could be viewed as providing extensive 
capital to be used in financing low risk loans.  This concept does not explain why the TARP 
variable was less significant in the corn yields.  However, as previously mentioned little impact 
on corn yields could easily be explained by corn simply being a different crop that holds several 
different purposes. One of those purposes is ethanol and all of my study time periods were after 
the ethanol boom when demand for corn was still on the rise.  
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Conclusions 
Based on my results and supplemental testing, I find further support for the findings of 
Butler and Cornaggia (2011) that access to capital has significant implications in terms of crop 
productivity and the producer success using exogenous shocks in access to capital.  In addition, I 
found that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was successful in mitigating the effects of the 
financial crisis in helping to spur economic growth. This output generated by farmers shows a 
physical example of how governmental input of capital infusions increased economic output.     
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Before Crisis 
(A)   
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Comparison of 
(A) and (B) 
        Correlation  Mean   Mean   Difference   t-statistic 
Soy        
     Finance = 1 40.122  40.249  -0.1271  -0.16 
     Finance = 0 42.994  44.547  -1.5536  -5.59 
        
Corn        
     Finance = 1 121.3  128.5  -7.1732  -2.98 
     Finance = 0 138.8  149.4  -10.587  -11.61 
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Table 1 
Data Descriptives  
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Yield_Soy 5111 43.2091763 9.5391719 37.2 44.8 50.3 
Yield_Corn 5296 140.751888 32.6204396 121.9 146 164.1 
Deposits 6286 1250981.64 6457318.63 151277 311081.5 678958 
Finance 6286 0.1994909 0.3996495 0 0 0 
TARP_Deposit_Ratio 6286 0.2669359 0.2691362 0 0.1951105 0.4415332 
Unemployment 6251 6.424764 2.9271153 4.2 5.6 8.2 
Per_Capita_Income 6251 24040.96 2446.53 22684.27 23877.01 25347.86 
Population_Density 6252 121.36592 357.122489 12.985206 33.415514 81.2902407 
Precipitation 6286 17.8700859 8.2062959 13.77 17.51 22.19 
GDD 6286 8.0149895 0.2260632 7.820038 8.0401247 8.2035777 
 
 
Presentation of pooled summary statistics for county-year crop observations. I examine counties in the 12 mid-western states from 2005 through 
2011, excluding the year 2008, with non-zero yields of corn and soybeans. Individual crop yields are measured in bushels per acre. Crop yields 
data come from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), which is affiliated with the United States Department of Agriculture. 
Deposits represent the sum of all deposits held within banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for a given county and 
a given year. Population Density is equal to the county population for a given year divided by the number of square miles in the county. 
Unemployment is equal to the percentage of the working population without employment for a given county-year. Per Capita Income is the 
average personal income for a given county-year, measured in thousands of dollars per person. Population, unemployment, and per capita income 
data come from the US Census Bureau’s website. Precipitation and GDD represent the inches of precipitation and number of growing degree 
days in an associated crop’s region from May through October of a given year, respectively.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Crisis Period = 1 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Yield_Soy 2503 43.9223332 9.4304192 38.5 45.1 50.5 
Yield_Corn 2649 145.921329 31.0057019 127.3 151 168.5 
Deposits 3145 1446918.93 7601255.82 169235 350785 749643 
Finance 3145 0.1993641 0.3995858 0 0 0 
TARP_Deposit_Ratio 3145 0.2680304 0.2673115 0 0.1988562 0.4403638 
Unemployment 3129 7.9716523 3.1269524 5.4 7.9 10.1 
Per_Capita_Income 3129 23161.23 2239.53 22066.1 23105.11 24234.86 
Population_Density 3129 122.170239 357.343356 12.922754 33.390671 82.0785957 
Precipitation 3145 20.2714754 9.1337872 15.63 19.28 26.16 
GDD 3145 7.9864148 0.2428075 7.776535 8.0297585 8.1909089 
 
These descriptives derive from the same sources as those above.  However, they are derived from Crisis Period 1(Years 2009, 2010, 201 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Crisis Period = 0 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Yield_Soy 2608 42.5247316 9.5944599 36 44 50 
Yield_Corn 2647 135.578542 33.3734231 117 141.1 159.9 
Deposits 3141 1054794.82 5052788.96 135666 279604 606597 
Finance 3141 0.199618 0.3997768 0 0 0 
TARP_Deposit_Ratio 3141 0.26584 0.2709891 0 0.1913039 0.4415463 
Unemployment 3122 4.8744074 1.5983856 3.7 4.7 5.7 
Per_Capita_Income 3122 24922.66 2325.1 23252.24 24845.88 26178.4 
Population_Density 3123 120.560057 356.956469 13.00842 33.450474 80.1882654 
Precipitation 3141 15.4656383 6.3009851 13.14 15.84 19.59 
GDD 3141 8.0436006 0.2040177 7.8743588 8.0545226 8.2406489 
 
These descriptives derive from the same sources as those above.  However, they are derived from Crisis Period 0(Years 2005, 2006, 2007) 
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Table 4 
Multivariate Results 
 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
soy_output soy_output 
 
corn_output corn_output 
Finance -0.376 0.349 
 
-5.431 -0.174 
 
(-0.42) (0.54) 
 
(-1.76) (-0.07) 
Crisis_Period 2.823*** 2.936*** 
 
11.35*** 13.72*** 
 
(5.92) (7.91) 
 
(7.66) (11.55) 
Finance_Crisis_Period -3.685*** -3.617*** 
 
-7.163** -8.802*** 
 
(-5.05) (-6.03) 
 
(-2.97) (-4.19) 
Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP 11.87*** 5.477* 
 
7.839 -5.541 
 
(4.01) (2.16) 
 
(0.97) (-0.76) 
Unemployment -0.739*** -0.972*** 
 
-1.997*** -3.475*** 
 
(-5.44) (-8.06) 
 
(-5.18) (-8.23) 
Per_Capita_Income -0.000234 
-
0.000315** 
 
-0.00128** 
-
0.00163*** 
 
(-1.67) (-2.94) 
 
(-2.82) (-3.53) 
Population_Density 1.569*** 0.438* 
 
6.726*** 3.002*** 
 
(5.91) (2.21) 
 
(7.53) (4.22) 
Precipitation 2.468*** 3.652*** 
 
9.864*** 6.610*** 
 
(8.29) (11.07) 
 
(10.00) (5.72) 
GDD -4.038** -8.018*** 
 
-27.71*** -69.01*** 
 
(-2.71) (-8.28) 
 
(-6.18) (-23.11) 
_cons 72.06*** 108.2*** 
 
350.8*** 720.2*** 
 
(5.57) (13.05) 
 
(9.02) (27.01) 
      State Fixed Effects No Yes 
 
No  Yes 
R-Squared 0.0921 0.4297 
 
0.1585 0.4168 
N 5087 5087 
 
5274 5274 
t statistics in parentheses 
     
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
*** 
p<0.001" 
    
Individual regressions for corn and soybeans. This table presents ordinary least squares regression results based on county-year-crop 
observations. The regression specification is Yield_Cornit  = α0 + β1Financeit + β2Crisis_Periodt + β3Finance*Crisis_Periodit + β4TARPit + 
β5Finance*TARPit + βnXit + βkS  + ei   The dependent variable is crop yield, measured in bushels per acre. I separately sort corn and soybean 
.Regressions 1& 3 include no state fixed effects; Regressions 2 & 4 include state dummy variables.  Low Deposits is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the level of bank deposits in a given county falls into the bottom quintile of all county-level bank deposits for a given year, and zero 
otherwise. Finance captures output when there is low access to capital in periods before the financial crisis and where access to TARP is zero 
Crisis_Period captures output during the financial crisis when access to capital is better and there is no TARP. Finance_Crisis_Period captures the 
difference in output in the financial crisis period when finance is poor and TARP is zero. Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP documents the relation in 
Finance_Crisis_Period as it changes as the level of TARP funding changes.  Population Density is equal to the county population for a given year 
divided by the number of square miles in the county. Unemployment is equal to the percentage of the working population without employment 
for a given county-year. Per Capita Income is the average personal income for a given county-year. Precipitation and GDD represent the inches of 
precipitation and number of growing degree days in an associated crop’s region.  
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Table 5 
Agricultural Bank Results 
 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
Agro = 0 Agro = 1 
 
Agro = 0 Agro = 1 
 
soy_output soy_output 
 
corn_output corn_output 
      Finance 2.709 0.147 
 
11.20* -4.213 
 
(1.53) (0.13) 
 
(2.20) (-1.03) 
      Crisis_Period 1.207 1.961** 
 
6.948** 8.549*** 
 
(1.67) (3.07) 
 
(3.20) (4.13) 
      Finance_Crisis_Period -5.069** -2.555** 
 
-12.41* -4.045 
 
(-3.23) (-3.26) 
 
(-1.92) (-1.59) 
      Finance_Crisis_Period_TARP 5.776 16.72*** 
 
-6.668 17.12 
 
(1.62) (4.77) 
 
(-0.75) (1.79) 
      Unemployment 0.369* -1.387*** 
 
0.785 -3.181*** 
 
(2.15) (-5.82) 
 
(1.60) (-4.40) 
      Per_Capita_Income 0.000311 -0.000267 
 
0.000125 -0.000788 
 
(1.81) (-1.13) 
 
(0.25) (-0.98) 
      Population_Density 1.752*** 3.542*** 
 
7.778*** 12.74*** 
 
(5.20) (6.59) 
 
(7.40) (6.97) 
      Precipitation 1.739*** 6.247*** 
 
7.811*** 20.53*** 
 
(5.28) (3.64) 
 
(7.54) (3.68) 
      GDD -0.344 -5.583** 
 
-20.45*** -30.12*** 
 
(-0.20) (-2.67) 
 
(-4.02) (-4.63) 
      _cons 21.15 73.51*** 
 
233.9*** 322.5*** 
 
(1.35) (3.80) 
 
(5.16) (5.28) 
      R-Sqaured 0.125 0.1878 
 
0.1986 0.243 
N 2394 2693 
 
2461 2813 
      t statistics in parentheses 
     
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
*** 
p<0.001" 
    
